

Aerospace Cybersecurity Intelligence



Space Cybersecurity

Challenges & the Importance of Collective Intelligence

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ABOUT US



Unique player in Space
& Aerospace
Cybersecurity Market
Intelligence



Independent
company, employee
owned



Founded in 2019 in
France,
headquartered in
Toulouse



Specialized in the
Space & Aerospace
market

Member of:



1st

French member of the Space ISAC
Chair member of the Supply
Chain Working Group (SCWG)

Part of the catalog:



Aviation, Space and Cyberthreat economies



**TOTAL AIRPORT
REVENUES
(2018)**

\$161 bn

Source: ACI

**AIRPORT
ECONOMY**

**TOTAL AIRLINE
REVENUES (2018)**

\$812 bn

Source: IATA

**AIRLINES
ECONOMY**

**GLOBAL SPACE
REVENUES (2019)**

\$366 bn

Source Euroconsult, Bryce, SIA

**SPACE
ECONOMY**

**TOTAL
CYBERCRIME
REVENUES**

**ILLICIT
PROFIT (2018)**

\$1.5 Tn

Source: Bromium

**≡ 10% of EU GDP rely
on GNSS availability**

**CYBERTHREAT
ECONOMY**

Espionage

\$ vs IP

(APT, state sponsored)

Growing competition among ransomware groups (1/2)



WORK ETHIC/REPUTATION

(Source Balckmatter, Babuk, CloP)

About us

We are a team that unites people according to one common interest - money.

We provide the best service for our clients and partners compared to our competitors.

We rely on honesty and transparency in our dealings with our victims.

We never attack the company twice and always fulfill our obligations.

We invite the recovery companies to cooperate with, you can contact us through "Contact Us".

Rules

We do not attack:

- Hospitals.
- Critical infrastructure facilities (nuclear power plants, power plants, water treatment facilities).
- Oil and gas industry (pipelines, oil refineries).
- Defense industry.
- Non-profit companies.
- Government sector.

We do not audit

next categories of organizations



Hospitals

Except private plastic surgery clinics, private dental clinics



Non-Profit

Any non-profitable charitable foundation



Schools

Except the major universities



Small Business

Companies with annual revenue less than 4 mln\$ (info about revenue we take from zoominfo)

PARTNERSHIP/AFFILIATE PROGRAMS

(Source Avos, Lockbit2.0)

AvosLocker Partnership Program

Avos2, AvosLocker's latest Windows variant, is one of the fastest in the market, with highly scalable threading and selective ciphers.

CONDITIONS FOR PARTNERS

[Ransomware] LockBit 2.0 is an affiliate program.

Affiliate program LockBit 2.0 temporarily relaunch the intake of partners.

Only you decide during communication how much the encrypted company will pay you. You get the payment to your personal ewallets in any currency, after which you transfer us the percentage of the foreclosure amount.

LockBit 2.0 does not function in post-Soviet countries.

We cooperate only with experienced pentesters who are real professionals in such tools as Metasploit Framework and Cobalt Strike.

Cooperation terms and conditions are determined for each Customer individually.

With our help you can easily get more targets over the weekend than with any other affiliate program over the week.

ATTENTION!!!

We have never attacked hospitals, orphanages, nursing homes, charitable foundations, and we will not.

Commercial pharmaceutical organizations are not eligible for this list; they are the only ones who benefit from the current pandemic.

If an attack mistakenly occurs on one of the foregoing organizations, we will provide the decryptor for free, apologize and help fix the vulnerabilities.

Growing competition among ransomware groups (1/2)



COMPETITION ON COMPUTATION SPEED

(Source Lockbit2.0)

Encryption speed comparative table for some ransomware - 02.08.2021							
PC for testing: Windows Server 2016 x64 \ 8 core Xeon E5-2680@2.40GHz \ 16 GB RAM \ SSD							
Name of the ransomware	Date of a sample	Speed in megabytes per second	Time spent for encryption of 100 GB	Time spent for encryption of 10 TB	Self spread	Size sample in KB	The number of the encrypted files (All file in a system 257472)
LOCKBIT 2.0	5 Jun, 2021	373 MB/s	4M 28S	7H 26M 40S	Yes	855 KB	109964
LOCKBIT	14 Feb, 2021	266 MB/s	6M 16S	10H 26M 40S	Yes	146 KB	110029
Cuba	8 Mar, 2020	185 MB/s	9M	15H	No	1130 KB	110468
BlackMatter	2 Aug, 2021	185 MB/s	9M	15H	No	67 KB	111018
Babuk	20 Apr, 2021	166 MB/s	10M	16H 40M	Yes	79 KB	109969
Sodinokibi	4 Jul, 2019	151 MB/s	11M	18H 20M	No	253 KB	95490
Ragnar	11 Feb, 2020	151 MB/s	11M	18H 20M	No	40 KB	110651
NetWalker	19 Oct, 2020	151 MB/s	11M	18H 20M	No	902 KB	109892
MAKOP	27 Oct, 2020	138 MB/s	12M	20H	No	115 KB	111002
RansomEXX	14 Dec, 2020	138 MB/s	12M	20H	No	156 KB	109700
Pysa	8 Apr, 2021	128 MB/s	13M	21H 40M	No	500 KB	108430
Avaddon	9 Jun, 2020	119 MB/s	14M	23H 20M	No	1054 KB	109952
Thanos	23 Mar, 2021	119 MB/s	14M	23H 20M	No	91 KB	81081
Ranzy	20 Dec, 2020	111 MB/s	15M	1D 1H	No	138 KB	109918
PwndLocker	4 Mar, 2020	104 MB/s	16M	1D 2H 40M	No	17 KB	109842
Sekhmet	30 Mar, 2020	104 MB/s	16M	1D 2H 40M	No	364 KB	random extension
Sun Crypt	26 Jan, 2021	104MB/s	16M	1D 2H 40M	No	1422 KB	random extension
REvil	8 Apr, 2021	98 MB/s	17M	1D 4H 20M	No	121 KB	109789
Conti	22 Dec, 2020	98 MB/s	17M	1D 4H 20M	Yes	186 KB	110220
Hive	17 Jul, 2021	92 MB/s	18M	1D 6H	No	808 KB	81797
Ryuk	21 Mar, 2021	92 MB/s	18M	1D 6H	Yes	274 KB	110784
Zeppelin	8 Mar, 2021	92 MB/s	18M	1D 6H	No	813 KB	109963
DarkSide	1 May, 2021	83 MB/s	20M	1D 9H 20M	No	30 KB	100549
DarkSide	16 Jan, 2021	79 MB/s	21M	1D 11H	No	59 KB	100171
Nephillm	31 Aug, 2020	75 MB/s	22M	1D 12H 40M	No	3061 KB	110404
DearCry	13 Mar, 2021	64 MB/s	26M	1D 19H 20M	No	1292 KB	104547
MountLocker	20 Nov, 2020	64 MB/s	26M	1D 19H 20M	Yes	200 KB	110367
Nemty	3 Mar, 2021	57 MB/s	29M	2D 0H 20M	No	124 KB	110012
MedusaLocker	24 Apr, 2020	53 MB/s	31M	2D 3H 40M	Yes	661 KB	109615
Phoenix	29 Mar, 2021	52 MB/s	32M	2D 5H 20M	No	1930 KB	110026
Hades	29 Mar, 2021	47 MB/s	35M	2D 10H 20M	No	1909 KB	110026
DarkSide	18 Dec, 2020	45 MB/s	37M	2D 13H 40M	No	17 KB	114741
Babuk	4 Jan, 2021	45 MB/s	37M	2D 13H 40M	Yes	31 KB	110760
REvil	7 Apr, 2021	37 MB/s	45M	3D 3H	No	121 KB	109790
BlackKingdom	23 Mar, 2021	32 MB/s	52M	3D 14H 40M	No	12460 KB	random extension
Avos	18 Jul, 2021	29 MB/s	59M	4D 2H	No	402 KB	79486

Comparative table of the information download speed of the attacked company							
Testing was made on the computer with a speed of Internet of 1 gigabit per second							
Downloading method	Speed in megabytes per second	Compression in real time	Hidden mode	drag'n'drop	Time spent for downloading of 10 GB	Time spent for downloading of 100 GB	Time spent for downloading of 10 TB
Stealer - StealBIT	83,46 MB/s	Yes	Yes	Yes	1M 59S	19M 58S	1D 9H 16M 57S
Rclone pcloud.com free	4,82 MB/s	No	No	No	34M 34S	5H 45M 46S	24D 18M 8S
Rclone pcloud.com premium	4,38 MB/s	No	No	No	38M 3S	6H 20M 31S	26D 10H 11M 45S
Rclone mail.ru free	3,56 MB/s	No	No	No	46M 48S	7H 48M 9S	32D 12H 16M 28S
Rclone mega.nz free	2,01 MB/s	No	No	No	1H 22M 55S	13H 48M 11S	57D 13H 58M 44s
Rclone mega.nz PRO	1,01 MB/s	No	No	No	2H 45M	1D 03H 30M 9S	114D 14H 16M 30S
Rclone yandex.ru free	0,52 MB/s	No	No	No	5H 20M 30S	2D 05H 25M 7S	222D 13H 52M 49S

Encryption speed :


- lockbit: 266 MB/s
- Lockbit 2.0: 373 MB/s
- Others: Max. speed ~185 MB/s

Download speed speed :

- StealBIT by Lockbit: 83.46 MB/s
- Others: 4.82 MB/s

Qualitative & Quantitative demonstrations

Overview of cyberattacks on space ecosystem



Example: Supply chain compromise



ILLUSTRATION OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN COMPROMISE IN THE SPACE INDUSTRY

I



During the production, a chip has been compromised. The compromise happened at an atomic level which suppose significant means and capabilities, probably a state.

Case mentioned by ESA during a conference Declassified at YE2018
Detection of the flaw took ~6 months
Could have had catastrophic consequences

- Test showed that the blueprint of the chip was exactly compliant with specification and expectations

II

The supplier distributed the chip to satellite operator. In this case, the chipset was used for a military satellite managing using cryptographic keys.




- Used in sophisticated military satellite
- Management of cryptographic key exchanges

III

The operating satellite embedding the chipset performed key exchange with other satellites or ground stations to allow confidentiality of exchange information. The random code generator is used to generate keys.

IV

- The random code generator proved not random
- Key could be guess in less than 30 minutes.
- According to ESA, this type of attack was obviously super power which has developed this kind of capabilities.




The key is compromised by the faulty chipset. The code generator being not "random" some pattern can be guessed after several tries, ultimately allowing rogue satellites or ground stations to read intercepted satellite communications.

Space Cybersecurity Economy: A rough estimate



GLOBAL SPACE REVENUES (2019)



- Government
- Commercial upstream
- Commercial downstream

Source Euroconsult, Bryce, SIA

Weighted average of
IT spend as % of
revenue


8.2%

<https://www.flexera.com/blog/technology-value-optimization/it-spending-by-industry/>

Recommended
averaged cybersecurity
budget as % of IT
budget

10%

Rough estimate
of Space IT
budget




Space
cybersecurity
economy
rough estimate

< \$3bn

Evolution of Space IT and Cybersecurity budgets




EVOLUTION OF IT BUDGET



- Commercial downstream
- Government
- Commercial upstream


EVOLUTION OF CYBERSECURITY BUDGET



**25 %
CAGR**
(2016-2021)

- Commercial downstream
- Government
- Commercial upstream

Adoption curve & factors



FACTORS IMPACTING CYBERSECURITY LEVEL

(From sat. manufacturer perspective)

- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| ● Maturity | ● Recommendations/guidance from industry or security agencies |
| ● Security Cost | ● Regulatory level |
| ● Time to market | ● Threat level |
| ● SWaP compromise | ● Commercial/Gov/Def |



Information sharing landscape: 2 main ecosystems



Space-ISAC:

HQ Colorado Springs
14 founding members
Around 25 current members
Start activities 2020
Numerous partner agencies
Part of NCIs
US-centric PPP open to international



national council of
isacs



EU institutions:

CCSE/ESA: Cybersecurity Center of Excellence "the enabler for collaborative cyber information sharing" under the Technology and Product Phase of ESA's ARTES
ESPI: EU Space Policy Institute
ENISA: foster the creation of ISACs, encourage collaboration
EUROCONTROL: ESA partner, REX on aviation
EDA: European Defense Agency: enabler for ministries of defense



EU collaborative groups:

COMET Cyber: CNES initiative, expert community
SGAC: Supported by the UN though very active in EU
Various independent communications groups (discords, slacks, etc.)

Status for MEA, CIS, APAC ?

Space-ISAC internals *(public info.)*



FOUNDING MEMBERS



COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST

- Smallsats COI
- Blockchain COI
- Workforce COI

WORKING GROUPS

- Information Sharing Working Group
- Analyst Working Group
- Supply Chain Working Group
(CyberInflight part of on the chair)

PARTNER AGENCIES



DoJ, DoD, NSA, DHS, Dept. of State, US Space Force, Space Command, Missile Defense Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, CISA

TASK FORCES

- SPD-5
- CMMC
- Table Topic and Exercise TF
- Space ISAC Summit

COLLABORATORS



NASA, Air Force Research Laboratory, NIST, US DoC

GENERAL MEMBERS

(only public members are shown)



THREAT INTEL PLATFORM

- Threat Intel
- Daily Observations
- Information sharing
- Surveys

MEMBERSHIP



CONFERENCES, EVENTS

- VOSS
- Space ISAC Summit
- REX, member discussions, etc.

S-ISAC: Feedback & Observations



1

US approach

- **US mindset:** openness and trust for members & partners
 - No feeling of hierarchy, ability to collaborate to any group
 - Easy to approach other members
 - Big to small members (major to startup)
 - Not political
- **Mostly US centric**
 - Very few EU members
 - Very well connected with the US ecosystem
- **Ambitious group**
 - Many ongoing initiatives
 - Willing to reach more than 100 members by the next year
 - Weekly follow-up and observable progress

2

Nascent ecosystem

- **Early stage** of the ISAC / Creation effective in 2020
- **Definition phases:**
 - Nascent with many initiatives still under construction
 - Focus on the WHY and WHAT before the HOW
- **Not yet entering into more practical/technical** exchanges
- **Time consuming** participation

3

View on RoW

- Strong willing to expand the member base
- Encourage participation of EU members
- The EU point of views seem expected during discussions
- The CN concern is a strong and recurring

4

Legacy - Influence

- ISAC platforms can be seen as “tools” by providers to penetrate specific markets (CTI, others)
- Some founding members brings expertise and vision from other experienced ISACs, avoid common roadblocks and use best practices
- S-ISAC has a different approach than other ISACs

What about an EU equivalent of the Space ISAC ?

Space conferences dedicated to cyber in the last 2 years



Organizers: S-ISAC, NIST, AIAA, DoD, DoC, DHS, USAF, MITRE, CISA, etc.
Supported by : Aerospace Corporation, Lockheed Martin, MITRE, Booz Allen, Kratos, Verizon, etc.



By the Defense Strategies Institute
 More Intelligence and military than cyber

CYSAT '22 is the only European event entirely dedicated to cybersecurity for **commercial space applications**, taking place online and in Paris, organized by CYSEC.

Cyber and Space Security Conference
 10-11 November 2021

CTF Ground Station Hackathon
 Spaceit

Organized by Estonia

COMET cyber

EU events


Space cybersecurity Initiatives & Specific documentation

(not exhaustive)



ACCELERATING SPACE-CYBER INITIATIVES

NIST DOCUMENTATION



A SHIFT TOWARD MORE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE

CCSDS-SEASEC DOCUMENTATION

Document	Type	Title	Published
CCSDS 350.0-G-3	Green	The Application of Security to CCSDS Protocols	Mar. 2019
<i>CCSDS 350.1-G-2</i>	Green	Security Threats against Space Missions	Dec. 2015
CCSDS 350.4-G-2	Green	CCSDS Guide for Secure System Interconnection	Apr. 2019
<i>CCSDS 350.6-G-1</i>	Green	Space Missions Key Management Concept	Nov. 2011
<i>CCSDS 350.7-G-2</i>	Green	Security Guide for Mission Planners	Apr. 2019
<i>CCSDS 350.8-M-2</i>	Magenta	Information Security Glossary of Terms	Feb. 2020
CCSDS 350.9-G-1	Green	CCSDS Cryptographic Algorithms	Dec. 2014
<i>CCSDS 351.0-M-1</i>	Magenta	Security Architecture for Space Data Systems	Nov. 2012
CCSDS 352.0-B-2	Blue	CCSDS Cryptographic Algorithms	Aug. 2019
CCSDS 356.0-B-1	Blue	Network Layer Security Adaptation Profile	Jun. 2018
CCSDS 357.0-B-1	Blue	CCSDS Authentication Credentials	Jul. 2019
<i>CCSDS A13.1-Y-1</i>	Yellow	CCSDS Recommended Procedures for Cloud-Based Interoperability Testing	Jun. 2018

OTHERS



Supporting the industry through market intel. resources



CONTRIBUTE TO THE NEXT EDITION OF OUR STRATEGIC REPORT

Space Cybersecurity Market Intelligence report

- Interview campaign
- Information sharing
- Case studies definition
- Identification of key relevant topics
- Data exchange
- Open to any collaboration and contribution...

Space Cybersecurity

Market Intelligence Report

1st Edition
Published: January 2021

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- Market outlook
- Sector trends and dynamics
- Strategic analysis and forecast
- Stakeholders' profile
- Regulatory landscape
- Threat intelligence

NASA: Cybersecurity spending

CYBERSECURITY BUDGET (FY2020)
Total OICO IT spending: \$278m
\$74m of which was budgeted for Institutional cybersecurity
Separate from the OICO mission offices in FY 2020 invested \$169m on mission-based cyber management at locations around the country.

EVOLUTION OF SOC BUDGET

SOC Total Cost of Ownership

- Option 1: Decentralized: \$12m/y in labor cost
- Option 2: Centralized: \$10.8m/y in labor cost + \$4 to \$9m in initial CAPEX

Annual savings: \$1.3m/y in labor cost

A&A (ACCESS & AUTHORISATION)

FY	# of IT systems	Center	Staff	Cost
2020	38	Goddard	4 part-time contractors 4 civil servants	\$765,000
2020	38	Kennedy	3 contractors 2 civil servants	\$554,000

Leads to an extrapolation for all NASA's 526 systems between \$6 to \$7m per year

- Organizations conduct A&A on their IT systems to ensure the systems meet cybersecurity requirements.
- At NASA, A&A is required for newly introduced systems and also annually for all other systems.
- NASA's IT inventory in 2020 included 526 systems classified in one of three risk exposure levels.

NASA: Definition of the attack surface

NASA devices	#
Mobile devices	15,000
Networking devices	4,500
Telephones	79,000
Laptops, desktops, workstations	49,000

NASA online presence	#
Websites	3,000
Accessible datasets	42,000

NASA systems & applications	#
Application	4,400
Software licenses	13,000
IT Systems	526
Data (in Terabytes)	39,000

Source: Office of Inspector General (OIG)

CYBERATTACKS AT NASA BY TYPE

FY	Total
FY17	1284
FY18	1137
FY19	1888
FY20	1786

Legend: Attribution, Impersonation, Web, Email, Employer Usage, Other, External/Removable media, Loss/use of equipment

IT SYSTEMS BY CRITICALITY

Legend: Low, Medium, High

TWO TYPES OF IT ASSETS

I. Institutional systems	II. Mission systems
Support day-to-day work of NASA employees	Support the agency's aeronautics, science and space exploration programs
Include networks, datacenters, web services, desktops and laptops	Host IT systems that control spacecraft and process specific data

Quantum in a nutshell

TECHNOLOGY FIELDS

- Quantum Computing:** uses the concept of qubits to outperform the performance of traditional computers
- Quantum Teleportation:** also known as quantum communication allows in sending quantum information from a sender to a distant receiver. Quantum teleportation is used in particular for cryptographic key exchanges.
- Quantum Sensing:** observing a quantum particle or electron would affect its states. It has applications in the authentication process to make sure that no interception of the encryption key has happened.

TERMINOLOGY

- Qubit or qbit:** like the "bit" used in computer science which represents either "0" or "1", qubits can have two states "0" and "1" at the same time. This property allows faster computation power.
- PQC:** Post Quantum Cryptography is not a quantum technology. Post quantum cryptography is traditional cryptography enhanced to overcome the threat of quantum computing
- QKD:** Quantum Key Distribution. Implementation of quantum cryptography for key distribution.
- QCI:** Quantum Communication Infrastructure. The ultimately unbreakable solution based on quantum cryptography.

QUANTUM FACTS (as 2021)

- 100 kilometers:** Maximum distance for performing realistic QKD on earth.
- 404 kilometers:** Maximum theoretical distance for performing QKD on earth.
- 1,120 kilometers:** Maximum distance for performing QKD from space
- 0.12 bit per sec:** Throughput achieved for performing QKD from space
- 2025 horizon:** Implementation of quantum computing is foreseen and likely to happen by 2025